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THE CLASSIFICATION OF ERISA AS "APPLICABLE NONBANKRUPTCY
LAW" UNDER SECTION 541(c)(2) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991)
In In re Lucas,' the Sixth Circuit determined that the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)2 constitutes "applicable
nonbankruptcy law"' and thus that the anti-alienation provisions of an
ERISA plan4 worked to exclude a debtor's interest in the plan from her
bankruptcy estate.' The Sixth Circuit's decision in Lucas places it with a
growing number of courts that have held that ERISA qualifies as "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law." 6
In Lucas, a Chapter Seven trustee sued to recover money from the
debtor's employee pension fund that had been distributed to the debtor
after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.7 The debtor's em-
ployer paid the funds from the debtor's ERISA-qualified defined-benefit
pension fund.' Seeking to recover from the debtor's employer, the
1. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
2. 29 U.SC. §§ 1001-1381 (1988).
3. 924 F.2d at 601.
4. To qualify under ERISA, a fund must include anti-alienation and assignment provisions.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. 924 F.2d at 603. According to the Bankruptcy Code, the initiation of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding creates an estate comprised of "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." I I U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). See infra notes 17-21 and accompa-
nying text. Section 541(cX2) limits the scope of the § 541(a) estate by excluding interests enforceable
under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." I 1 U.S.C. § 542(cX2) (1988). See infra note 19 and accom-
panying text.
6. To date, four circuits have held that the ERISA provisions constitute "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" as defined in § 541(cX2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Fourth Circuit adopted this
view in In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). Next, In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.
1991), the focus of this Comment, adopted the Moore rationale. Following the growing trend, in
November 1991, the Third Circuit adopted a similar view in Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.
1991). Finally, in December of 1991, the Tenth Circuit espoused the same view when it decided In
re Harline, No. 90-4157, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28540 (10th Cir. December 5, 1991).
7. 924 F.2d at 598. The trustee did not object to the claim that $2,000 of the fund was exempt
personal property under TENN. CoDE ANN. § 26-2-102 (1987), which allows a debtor to protect
certain personal property-including money or funds on deposit with a bank or other financial insti-
tution. (The current maximum exemptible amount under § 26-2-102 is $4000). The trustee, how-
ever, objected to payments made to the debtor after the debtor filed for Chapter 7 protection. See
infra note 8.
8. 924 F.2d at 598. Holiday Inn Corporation, the debtor's employer, had established a retire-
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trustee claimed that the money paid to the debtor9 was the property of
the estate and not exempted under Tennessee law."0 The debtor's em-
ployer denied liability for the payments, arguing that the debtor's interest
in the account was excluded from the estate by virtue of the ERISA anti-
alienation restrictions.11
The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for summary judg-
ment, refusing to expand the definition of "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" to include ERISA.12 On appeal from the district court's affirmation
of the bankruptcy court's decision,13 the Sixth Circuit reversed14 and
ment account for its employees. Since Lucas' interest was fully vested, she had complete access to
the funds. Id.
9. The plan had distributed a total of $7491.11 in three installments after the commencement
of the bankruptcy case. Id.
10. Tennessee law exempts a debtor's right to receive payments under a pension plan from
inclusion in a bankruptcy estate, provided:
[Tihat the debtor has no right or option to receive [the assets] except as monthly or other
periodic payments beginning at or after age fifty-eight (58). Assets of such funds or plans
are not exempt if the debtor may, at his option, accelerate payments so as to receive pay-
ments in a lump sum....
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-111(1) (1987). The trustee argued that the debtor's ability to receive
payments from the trust violated this section and, therefore, that the assets of the fund could not be
excluded from'the bankruptcy estate under Tennessee law. 924 F.2d at 598-99.
11. 924 F.2d at 600. See supra note 4. The employer argued that ERISA was "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" and, that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions sufficed to exclude the assets from
the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 600. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
12. In re Lucas, 100 B.R. 969 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.), aff'd 110 B.R. 335 (M.D. Tenn. 1989),
rev'd, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991). The bankruptcy court based its
decision on a narrow interpretation of § 541(c)(2), and held that only state spendthrift-trust law
qualifies as "applicable nonbankruptey law." 100 B.R. at 970.
Spendthrift trusts provide a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary while at the same time
securing the fund against the beneficiary's improvidence or incapacity. Such trusts usually contain
provisions that prohibit the alienation of future funds by either the beneficiary or his creditors. 6
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, TRusTs § 40 (1987). Had Lucas' ERISA account been classified as a
spendthrift trust, Tennessee spendthrift-trust law would have applied and the account could have
been excluded from the bankruptcy estate. However, the bankruptcy court determined that Lucas'
ability to receive funds from the account indicated that the fund was not a spendthrift trust and,
therefore, neither the Tennessee spendthrift-trust provision, TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-111 (1987),
nor § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excluded the assets from the bankruptcy estate. 100 B.R. at
971. See also infra note 29.
The bankruptcy court based its holding on the decisions of two previous Tennessee bankruptcy
court cases that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2) was expressly limited to state
spendthrift-trust law. 100 B.R. at 970. See In re Ridenour, 45 B.R. 72, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1984); In re Faulkner, 79 B.R. 362 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (only those ERISA-qualified pension
plans that also constitute valid spendthrift trusts under state law can be excluded from the debtor's
estate).
13. In re Lucas, 110 B.R. 335 (M.D. Tenn. 1989), rev'd, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
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held that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" meant all applicable law and,
as a result, that the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA sufficed to ex-
clude a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan from the
bankruptcy estate.' 5
Under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 6 the institution of
Chapter Seven bankruptcy proceedings results in the gathering of the
debtor's valuable property to be sold for the benefit of the debtor's credi-
tors.Y" In satisfying the claims of creditors, courts broadly define "prop-
erty of the estate" to encompass as much property as possible.'
However, section 541(c)(2) provides that any "restriction on the transfer
of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a [bankruptcy proceed-
ing.]"" 9 In addition, once included in the bankruptcy estate, certain
property may be exempted from the estate.2° To protect the assets of the
bankruptcy estate, holders of the debtor's property are prohibited from
making disbursements and may be liable to the trustee for unauthorized
payments.
Congress passed ERISA 22 in 1974 to help guarantee that workers
14. 924 F.2d at 603.
15. Id. at 598.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
17. S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5868-69. To this end § 541(cXl) states that all of the debtor's property or interests in property
become part of the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a), regardless of whether the property or interest
is governed by any agreement between parties restricting transfer. However, a debtor's interest in a
trust with restrictions on transfer that are enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy" law is
given effect in bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(cX2) (1988). See also infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
18. S. REP. No. 598, supra note 17, at 5869. Even with a broad reading of § 541(a), the debtor
is still entitled to all state-law exemptions, see supra note 10, and any exclusions allowed under
§ 541(cX2). See supra note 17. For a discussion of property belonging to the estate, see Geoffrey
Orlandi, Recent Development, Pro erty of the Fstat" Section 541, 3 BANKR. DEVEL. J. 341 (1986).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(cX2) (1988).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988). This section of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor can
exempt from the property of her estate either property exempt under federal or state law or property
identified in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). See supra note 12. This list includes payments under pension plans,
"to the extent necessary for the support of the debtor...." 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). As a
result, even if a debtor is unable to exclude property from the estate via § 542(c)(2), she may still
withhold a portion of that property from the estate under § 522(b).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1988). This section states that any holder of the debtor's property must
turn over such property to the trustee unless the property is of inconsequential value to the estate.
Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). For a briefdiscussion of ERISA, see John I. Houseal, Jr. &
1992]
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would be able to collect promised retirement benefits.23 Congress sought
to achieve this goal by making ERISA a comprehensive regulatory stat-
ute that requires disclosure and reporting, and imposes fiduciary obliga-
tions on employers.24 To qualify under ERISA, a plan must contain
anti-alienation provisions.25 Thus, ERISA indicates that only the em-
ployee is entitled to even fully vested funds that are available for distribu-
tion.26 To ensure that the provisions of ERISA would be enforced,
Congress provided that ERISA supersede any and all state laws insofar
as they relate to employee benefit plans. 27 Thus, whether interests in an
ERISA-qualified plan are excluded from the bankruptcy estate hinges on
whether courts recognize ERISA as "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
under section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re Goff,28 the Fifth Circuit determined that a debtor's vested
interest in two ERISA-qualified pension plans was bankruptcy-estate
property.29 The court determined initially that ERISA is not "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2),31 and further that ERISA
was insufficient to exempt pension benefits (once they became part of the
Jeffery A. Jarett, An Overview of ERISA From a Litigator's Standpoint, 25 TENN. B.J., Jan.-Feb.
1989, at 20.
23. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 214 (1986).
24.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information
with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to the Federal courts.
It is further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce, the
Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and their
beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by re-
quiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to
meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(b), (c) (1988).
25. "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned
or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). Additionally, for a defined-benefit plan to be tax ex-
empt under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code an anti-alienation or assignment provision must be
contained in the plan. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See infra note 53.
28. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 589.
30. Id. at 580. The court determined that Congress only intended to exclude traditional spend-
thrift trusts under this exception to the general rule regarding property of the bankruptcy estate in
§ 541(a), relying on the inconclusive legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 582.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/22
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bankruptcy estate) from the estate under section 522(b)(2)(A). 31 The
court held that interests in an ERISA-qualified plan could be excluded or
exempted from the estate under state spendthrift-trust law.32 However,
the court determined that the plans involved were not spendthrift
trusts,33 and thus that the property was properly part of the bankruptcy
estate.34
In In re Graham,35 the Eighth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's rea-
soning with regard to ERISA benefits and bankruptcy. The Graham
court held that neither the exclusion provision set out in section
541(c)(2)36 nor the exemption provision of section 522(b)(2)(A) applied
to ERISA.3 7 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however, the Eighth Circuit con-
centrated mainly on the possible exempt status of ERISA benefits and
not on the possible exclusion of plan benefits.38 The court examined the
31. Id. at 585. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX2XA) (1988) (once in the estate, certain property can be
exempted from the bankruptcy estate under either applicable federal or state law). The Fifth Circuit
determined that ERISA did not qualify as federal law referred to in § 522(b)(2)(A). Once again, the
court relied on the legislative history of the Code for its justification that ERISA did not qualify to
exclude or exempt ERISA-governed property from the estate. 706 F.2d at 585.
The court reasoned that since the legislative history of § 522(b)(2)(A) specifically listed property
that could be exempted under federal law, without including ERISA, Congress consciously decided
not to have § 522(b)(2)(A) apply to ERISA. Id. See S. REP. No. 589, supra note 17, at 5861.
The court attempted to distinguish ERISA from the statutes in the legislative history and thus
bolster its conclusion that ERISA was never intended to apply under § 522(b)(2)(A). 706 F.2d at
585 n.29. These listed statutes, the court argued, contained absolute prohibitions against alienation,
whereas ERISA's alienation requirements only related to whether or not the plan would be qualified
under ERISA and be tax exempt. Id. at 585.
32. 706 F.2d at 586-87. The court determined that since state spendthrift-trust law was suffi-
cient to exclude or exempt property under § 541(cX2) and § 522(bX2)(A) respectively, ERISA-qual-
ified plans that constituted spendthrift trusts could still be excluded or exempted. Id.
33. Id. at 588. The court stated that "neither law nor equity would afford self-settled [ERISA-
qualified] plans 'spendthrift trust' exemptions in bankruptcy." Id. The Goff court reasoned that
such recognition would allow debtors to dump assets into restricted plans of which they were the
beneficiaries and that were beyond the reach of creditors. Id. The Fifth Circuit established this rule
earlier in Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981), when it stated that if a
beneficiary created a trust for his own benefit but inserted a spendthrift clause restricting alienation
or assignment, such clause would be void and the benefits attachable by creditors. Id. at 663.
34. 706 F.2d at 589. The court, after determining that the plans involved could not be gov-
erned by state spendthrift trust law, concluded that there was no law that could serve to exclude or
exempt the property from the estate. Id.
35. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 1271.
37. Id. at 1274.
38. Id. at 1271. The Eighth Circuit gave only a brief discussion of the possibility that ERISA
plan benefits might be excluded from the bankruptcy estate: "[t]he question of pension rights is dealt
with as a matter of exemption." Id. at 1272. The court again read the legislative history of
§ 541(c)(2) narrowly to conclude that only traditional state-recognized spendthrift trusts were
Washington University Open Scholarship
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legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A) and found that the anti-aliena-
tion provisions of an ERISA plan at issue were insufficient to exempt the
property from the estate under that section.39
The Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in holding
that ERISA-qualified pension benefits are neither excluded nor exempted
from the bankruptcy estate. In In re Lichstrahl,4 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" did not encompass
ERISA and, therefore, that benefits under such a plan were property of
the estate under section 541(a).41 The court recognized that ERISA-
qualified plans could be excluded from the estate under section 541(c)(2)
if they qualified under state law as spendthrift trusts.42 However, the
court determined that, because the plans involved were not spendthrift
trusts under Florida law,43 they were properly included in the estate.'
Furthermore, the court determined that, once included in the estate,
within the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" exception under § 541(c)(2). Id. at 1271. Additionally,
the Graham court stated that the Bankruptcy Code had the purpose of gathering all property of the
debtor, even that needed for a fresh start, and then allowing exemptions of certain property once
within the estate. The court then indicated that, to this end, § 522(d)(10)(E) allowed pension bene-
fits to be exempted to the extent necessary for subsistence. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text. Based on this section, the Eight Circuit concluded that Congress never intended that pension
benefits might be excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2). 726 F.2d at 1272. The court reasoned
that it would be superfluous for pension benefits to be addressed in two separate sections of the Code;
thus the specific reference, to pension funds in § 522(d)(10)(E) overrides the general language of
§ 541(c)(2). Id. See supra note 20.
39. 726 F.2d at 1274. The court reached this conclusion based on § 522(b)(2)(A)'s failure spe-
cifically to include ERISA. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the section's list was illustrative,
but found ERISA's absence to be determinative of its applicability. The court emphasized that,
although the anti-alienation provisions of some of the statutes listed in the legislative history of
§ 522(b)(2)(A) were similar to those found in ERISA plans, ERISA plans focus on private-employer
payments as opposed to federal government payments, thus distinguishing ERISA. Id. For a criti-
cism of the Graham decision, see Case Comment, The Fate of ERISA-qualified Pensions Plans Under
the Federal Bankruptcy Code: In re Graham, 11 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rav. 1045 (1985).
40. 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 1490. The court relied on the reasoning of the courts in Goff and Graham to con-
clude that § 541(c)(2)'s reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was confined solely to state
spendthrift-trust law. Id. See supra notes 28-34, 35-39 and accompanying text.
42. 750 F.2d at 1490. The court did acknowledge that an ERISA-qualified plan enforceable
under state spendthrift-trust law would be excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2). Id.
43. Id. at 1490. The court defined "spendthrift trusts" as those trusts that provide for the
maintenance of another while at the same time protecting the fund from use by the beneficiary or
anyone else. Id. See Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 57 So. 243 (Fla. 1911). The Lichstrahl
court then indicated that a trust over which a beneficiary had total control was not a spendthrift
trust. 750 F.2d at 1490.
44. 750 F.2d at 1490.
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these benefits were not exemptible under section 522(b)(2)(A). 4 5
With the decision in In re Daniel,46 the Ninth Circuit joined the list of
circuits including ERISA-plan benefits in bankruptcy estates. In Daniel,
the court relied on Goff to conclude that Congress did not intend that
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA-qualified plans create exceptions or
exemptions to the bankruptcy estate under either section 541(c)(2) or
section 522(b)(2)(A). 47 The court based its determination of the inappli-
cability of section 541(c)(2) to ERISA on both the section's legislative
history4" and case law.49 Further, the court concluded that ERISA did
not fall under the exemptions contemplated by section 522(b)(2)(A), re-
lying on the legislative history of the section"0 and the unique character
of ERISA benefits.5"
In In re Moore,52 however, the Fourth Circuit held that ERISA consti-
45. Id. at 1491. The Lichstrahl court stated that since the plans involved could not be gov-
erned by state spendthrift-trust law, the plan benefits could be exempted under § 522(b)(2)(A) only if
ERISA constituted federal law under that section. Id. See supra note 21. The court then deter-
mined that Congress did not intend to include ERISA within the definition of § 522(b)(2)(A), see
supra notes 31, 37 and accompanying text, and that this result was compelled by ERISA's absence
from the illustrative list of statutes to which § 522(b)(2)(A) applied. 750 F.2d at 1491. See supra
note 3 1.
46. 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
47. Id. at 1359.
48. Id. at 1359-60. The court stated that both the House and the Senate reports "expressly
limit § 541(cX2) to spendthrift trusts." Id. at 1359 n.17.
49. Id. at 1360. The court sided with the courts in Goff, Graham, and Lichstrahl and held that
"'applicable nonbankruptcy law' refers only to state spendthrift trust law." Id. The court did rec-
ognize that ERISA plans could be excluded under § 541(c)(2) if they also qualified as spendthrift
trusts. Id.
50. 771 F.2d at 1361. The court also relied on the holdings in Goff, Graham and Lichstrahl,
which held that ERISA was not intended to be included in the list of exempted federal law under
§ 522(bX2)(A) because of its conspicuous absence from that section's legislative history. See supra
note 31.
51. 771 F.2d at 1361. The court emphasized that the list of benefits in statutes exempt under
§ 522(bX2)(A) were all federal in nature, whereas ERISA benefits were derived from private em-
ployers. The court reasoned that this distinction mandated that benefits protected under ERISA
were not to be afforded the same protections in bankruptcy given to benefits that originated with the
government. Id.
The Daniel case was recently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in In re Reed, No. 90-15874, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 28739 (9th Cir. December 11, 1991). Although Reed recognized that several
other circuits had reached contrary findings since Daniel was decided, it refused to overturn the
Daniel decision. The Reed court stated that since "Daniel is the law of this circuit and also the
majority view in the nation," it would continue to follow Daniel's ruling that ERISA regulations do
not constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as defined in § 542(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at *9-10.
52. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). In Moore, the trustee of several Chapter Seven debtors
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tutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law.""3 The court based its decision
solely on the wording of section 541(c)(2) itself, indicating that an exami-
nation of the legislative history was unnecessary.5 4 As a result, the court
concluded that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions protected a debtor's
interest in an ERISA-qualified plan from inclusion in the bankruptcy es-
tate.55 In Moore, the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court to
sought to have the debtors' interests in ERISA-qualiled profit sharing and pension plans included in
the debtor's bankruptcy estates. Id. at 1476-77.
53. Id. at 1480. The court based its determination on the plain language of § 541(c)(2) and
concluded that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" means all nonbankruptcy law. Id. at 1478-79. See
supra note 12.
Additionally, the court relied on other uses of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in the
Bankruptcy Code to buttress its opinion that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was not limited to
state spendthrift-trust law. 907 F.2d at 1478. The court stated that it was unlikely that Congress
intended the same term to have different meanings throughout the Code, especially in light of the
fact that the entire Code was enacted at the same time. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d), 108(a) (1988). See
also Morrison-Knudson Constr. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983) ("[A] word is
presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute.").
Finally, the court indicated that when Congress had intended state law to apply, it expressly stated
so. 907 F.2d at 1478. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988) ("An entity may be a debtor... if and
only if such entity.., is generally authorized to be a debtor under such chapter by State law"); 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988) ("an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate ... prop-
erty that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law... is applicable..").
The court reasoned that if Congress had wanted only state spendthrift law to apply, it would not
have used the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in § 541(c)(2). 907 F.2d at 1478. Congress did
not use the term "state spendthrift law," however, and the court declined to read such a limitation
into the statute. Id. (citing In re Ralstin, 61 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986)).
54. 907 F.2d at 1478-79. Although other courts relied on the legislative history of § 541(c)(2),
see infra notes 30, 38, 41, 48 and accompanying text, the Fourth Circuit held that the unambiguous
language of § 541(c)(2) obviated the need for review. 907 F.2d at 1479. See Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) ("When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete.").
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that even if an ambiguity warranted resort to the legis-
lative history of the section, such history was inconclusive. 907 F.2d at 1479. Section 541(c)(2)'s
legislative history states that "[§ 541(c)(2)] preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to
the extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325.
While the Fourth Circuit declined to give authoritative value to the references to spendthrift trusts
in the legislative history of § 541(c)(2), in Goff the Fifth Circuit took this reference to indicate that
§ 541(c)(2) was to apply only to state spendthrift trust law. 706 F.2d at 589.
55. 907 F.2d at 1480. The court indicated that in light of Congress' purpose in enacting
ERISA, see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text, to disregard the anti-alienation provisions of
the Act would be counterproductive. ERISA seeks to protect employee retirement benefits and to
ensure that employees will receive them. Id. If the anti-alienation provisions were not given effect,
"substantive pension benefits [would] be subject to the vagaries of state law." Id. (citing PPG Indus.
Pension Plan A v. Crews, 902 F.2d 1148, 1151 (4th Cir. 1990)). To this end, ERISA § 1144(a) states
that ERISA is to supersede all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. Id. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1988). See also infra note 77.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/22
1992] CLASSIFICATION OF ERISA IN BANKRUPTCY
determine that ERISA's status as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" ena-
bled the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA to protect a debtor's interest
in a pension plan from becoming property of the bankruptcy estate.5 6
56. Recently, two more circuits followed the reasoning espoused in Moore and determined that
ERISA does constitute "applicable nonbankruptey law" for § 541(c)(2) purposes.
In Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit held that the "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" provision of § 541(cX2) includes federal law, and that, therefore, § 541(c)(2)'s
exclusionary provision covers ERISA-regulated plans. "We believe it reasonable to conclude that
Congress intended to provide protection against the claims of creditors for a person's interest in
pension plans, unless vulnerable to challenge as fraudulent conveyances or voidable preferences."
Id. at 82.
In reviewing the applicability of ERISA provisions to the contested language in § 541(c)(2), the
Velis court stated that "any conceivable doubt as to the meaning of the term ... is removed when
one considers how the same term is used elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 81 (citing
United Say. Ass'n. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). The Velis court then
examined other sections of the Bankruptcy Code (§ 25(d), §§ 108(a), (b), and (c), and
§ 365(nXI)(B)), and determined that these provisions clearly included federal law in their definitions
of "applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id. Since the Bankruptcy Code uniformly includes federal law
as a part of applicable nonbankruptcy law, the Velis court held that ERISA constituted "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" for § 541 purposes as well. Id. at 82.
In re Harline, No. 90-4157, 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 28540 (10th Cir. December 5, 1991), is another
recent case to adopt the Moore/Lucas rationale. There the court noted that "even considering the
legislative history [of § 541], which we acknowledge was almost exclusively concerned with preserv-
ing state-recognized spendthrift trusts, we do not find 'a clearly expressed legislative intention' to
limit the meaning of 541(cX2) exclusively to state-recognized spendthrift trusts." Id. at *19-20 (cit-
ing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.")). Thus, through Harline, the Tenth Circuit became the fourth circuit to find that
§ 541(cX2) restrictions must be read in harmony with ERISA regulations.
Several other lower courts have similarly decided this issue. See, eg., In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118,
123 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("exclusion [of ERISA] in section 541(c)(2) does not evidence a con-
gressional intent to include ERISA pension benefits in property of the estate"); In re Ralstin, 61 B.R.
502, 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) ("The crucial question ... [is] whether the debtor's interest in
qualified ERISA plans are beyond the reach of general creditors in non-bankruptcy proceedings.").
In addition, in Morton v. Farm Credit Services, 937 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit
intimated that it would follow a line of reasoning akin to Moore if an ERISA question arose. In
Morton, the court held that a teacher's interest in a retirement and equity fund was excluded from
the bankruptcy estate. The court agreed that "the plain language of § 541(c)(2) does not require that
a retirement plan be a 'traditional' spendthrift trust... § 541(cX2) should not be confined in its
recognition of enforceable transfer restrictions to those found in 'traditional' spendthrift trusts." Id.
at 357 (quoting McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204,
1207 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Furthermore, in the Ninth Circuit there are indications that the line of reasoning espoused in
Moore is gaining support. In In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990), Judge Fletcher voiced
his concerns regarding the Ninth Circuit's continued adherence to the decision in In re Daniel, 771
F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), see supra notes 46-51, and indicated
that the arguments posed by the Moore court were more consistent with the purposes behind both
the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA. 917 F.2d at 1169 (Fletcher, J., concurring). However, in In re
Reed, No. 90-15874, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28739 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1991), the Ninth Circuit had
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In In re Lucas,57 the Sixth Circuit determined that ERISA did consti-
tute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" and that the anti-alienation provi-
sions contained in an ERISA-qualified plan were sufficient to exclude a
debtor's interest in the plan from the bankruptcy estate under section
541(c)(2). s s In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the view that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" referred solely to state spendthrift-trust
law. 59 Instead, the court adopted the more expansive view that "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law" refers to all nonbankruptcy law.'
The Fourth Circuit's Moore holding heavily influenced the Sixth Cir-
cuit.61 The Lucas court determined that the wording of section 541(c)(2)
was unambiguous, rendering an analysis of the legislative history unnec-
essary and unwarranted. 2 The Sixth Circuit was persuaded by the
Moore court's conclusion that limiting "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
to state spendthrift-trust law would be inconsistent with the other refer-
ences to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in the Bankruptcy Code.6 3 The
court also noted that congressional references to state law were specific
and express. 4 Furthermore, even if the legislative history applied, the
Lucas court agreed with the Moore court that it was inconclusive.65
After concluding that ERISA qualified as "applicable nonbankruptcy
law," the Lucas court then addressed whether ERISA contained an en-
forceable transfer restriction that would prevent benefits from being in-
cluded in the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2).66 After
the opportunity to review its decision in Daniel. The Ninth Circuit upheld its determination that
ERISA regulations do not constitute "applicable nonbankruptey law" as referred to in § 541(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *9-10.
57. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
58. Id. at 601. Unlike the courts adopting the narrow construction of § 541(c)(2), the Sixth
Circuit never addressed the issue of whether the benefits might be subject to exemption under
§ 522(b)(2)(A). The court held that its determination that ERISA was "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" under § 541(c)(2) disposed of the case. Id. at 603.
59. Id. at 601.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
62. 924 F.2d at 601.
63. Id. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64. 924 F.2d at 601 (when Congress "intended to refer to state law, it did so expressly"). See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. 924 F.2d at 602. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Lucas court argued that
the legislative history only clarified that § 541(c)(2) was to continue to apply to spendthrift trusts,
but that it in no way limited the protection of § 541(c)(2) to these trusts. 924 F.2d at 602. See also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
66. 924 F.2d at 602.
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outlining the legislative purpose behind ERISA,6 7 the Sixth Circuit de-
termined that the protection of worker benefits could be achieved only by
granting enforceability to the plan's anti-alienation and assignment pro-
visions.6" The court then concluded that the anti-alienation provisions,
written to protect worker benefits from employer withdrawal and from
general creditors, also prevented turnover of the plan benefits to the
bankruptcy trustee.69
The Sixth Circuit noted that its holding would harmonize the Bank-
ruptcy Code, ERISA, and the Internal Revenue Code.70 In addition, the
court pointed out that this result would ensure that a plan would not lose
its tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code section 501 due to the
turnover of one participant's interest to a bankruptcy trustee.71 Finally,
the court observed that ensuring that the anti-alienation provisions of
ERISA would be given effect resulted in uniform benefits treatment.72
The Sixth Circuit's determination in In re Lucas that ERISA consti-
tutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law," and, as a result, that a debtor's
interest in an ERISA-qualified plan is excluded from the bankruptcy es-
tate, is a sound decision. The language of section 541(c)(2) is clear and
unambiguous. 7  Decisions that have turned to the legislative history of
section 541(c)(2) to resolve this issue over emphasize the history's impor-
tance.74 By holding that ERISA does not constitute "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law," the majority of courts have denied ERISA the effectiveness
that Congress intended.75
67. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
68. 924 F.2d at 603. The court emphasized Congress' desire to ensure that workers actually
would receive the benefits promised to them. To achieve this goal, the Lucas court argued, Congress
included § 1056(d)(1) to prohibit the assignment or alienation of plan benefits. Id. at 602-03.
69. Id. at 603.
70. Id.
71. Id. See Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480. See also supra note 27.
72. 924 F.2d at 603.
73. See supra notes 17-20, 27.
74. "Congress enacted § 541(cX2), not its accompanying legislative reports." Moore, 907 F.2d
at 1479. As a result, the statute must be interpreted on its face; "applicable nonbankruptey law"
must be read to mean just that. It is beyond the province of the courts to assign a meaning to an
unambiguous term based on an inconclusive reference in the statute's legislative history. "Legisla-
tive history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity, but '[i]n the
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language of the statute itself
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" Burlington Northern Railroad, 481 U.S. 454, 461
(1987) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)). As a result, the legislative history
of § 541(c)(2) should not be read to override the clear expression of § 541(c)(2).
75. See supra 31 and accompanying text. The courts in Goff and Graham indicated that
1992]
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If ERISA is held not to be "applicable nonbankruptcy law," ERISA
funds would be unprotected from inclusion in the bankruptcy estate un-
less courts consider them spendthrift-trust funds.76 Congress could not
have intended this result because its purpose in enacting ERISA was to
implement a uniform independent system for regulating pension plans."
Furthermore, granting exclusion to ERISA-plan benefits furthers Con-
gress' goal of protecting employees' retirement benefits from any and all
types of alienation.78
Adoption of the position taken by the Sixth Circuit in Lucas should
encourage continued investment in ERISA-qualified plans and increased
protection for employee benefits. In addition, classifying ERISA as "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law" will serve to achieve Congress' intent in
passing ERISA; ERISA will afford the maximum amount of protection
in all settings. If ERISA benefits are not excluded from bankruptcy es-
tates, not only will employees encourage employers to invest funds in
other exempt, and possibly more risky ventures, but also the expectations
of plan participants and their beneficiaries will be negated.
Jay A. Yalowitz
ERISA does not constitute federal law under § 522(b)(2)(A). See supra notes 31, 39 and accompa-
nying text.
It appears that the Goff court reasoned that ERISA benefits were not to be afforded the same
protection as were benefits derived under statutes listed in the legislative history of § 522(b)(2)(A).
However, a careful reading of this legislative history reveals that the operative language of the sec-
tion is, "/s/ome of the other items that may be excluded..." S. REP. No. 589, supra note 17, at 5861
(emphasis added). Therefore, the list of statutes in the legislative history of § 522(b)(2)(A) must be
seen as only illustrative and not exclusive.
76. The whole purpose of ERISA was to provide protection for employee retirement benefits.
To this end, Congress required that, for a plan to be qualified under ERISA (and to obtain tax
exempt status), it had to contain internal anti-alienation provisions. See supra note 23 and accompa-
nying text.
77. See supra notes 23-24. Section 1144(a) of ERISA states that, except for situations not
applicable here, "the provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all state law insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See
supra note 27 and accompanying text. If ERISA were intended to supersede all state law regarding
employee benefit plans, it would be completely illogical that one would have to return to these
superseded state laws to find protection for ERISA plans. See supra note 55.
78. Congress felt that ERISA was needed because of the uncertainty employees faced regarding
whether they would actually receive retirement benefits that they had been promised. See supra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text. As a result, Congress' goal in encouraging participation in
ERISA-qualified plans could be achieved by making ERISA plans as attractive as possible by al-
lowing the required anti-alienation provisions to be given effect in bankruptcy proceedings. See
supra notes 17, 25.
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